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1 In this article, we introduce the Internet deployment
guidelines for Deterministic Packet Marking (DPM) – a
novel IP traceback method. Unlike other packet marking
schemes, DPM cannot be deployed sporadically on the
Internet. Therefore, in order to perform the traceback,
a structured way of deployment is needed. Related to
topology and deployment issues, discussion comparing
the features of other full path schemes and ingress packet
filtering to those of DPM is also presented.
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1. Introduction
In recent years much interest and consideration
has been paid to the topic of securing the In-
ternet infrastructure that continues to become
a medium for a broad range of transactions.
A number of approaches to security have been
proposed, each attempting to mitigate a specific
set of concerns. After several high-profile Dis-
tributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks on
major US web sites in 2000, numerous IP trace-
back approaches [1], [2] have been suggested
to identify the attacker(s). The previously pro-
posed schemes can be categorized in two broad
groups. One group of the solutions relies on the
routers in the network to send their identities to
the destinations of certain packets, either encod-
ing this information directly in rarely used bits
of the IP header, or by generating a new packet
to the same destination. The biggest limitation
of this type of solutions is that they are focused
only on flood-based DoS and DDoS attacks,
and cannot handle attacks comprised of a small
number of packets. Additionally, for the large
scale DDoS attacks, these schemes are not very
effective. The second group of solutions in-
volves centralized management and logging of
packet information on the network. Solutions
of this type introduce a large overhead, and are
complex and not scalable.
Deterministic Packet Marking (DPM), a new
approach to IP traceback, was recently intro-
duced to mitigate some of the above short-
comings. Even though DPM is classified as
a scheme of the first type, the substantial dif-
ferences of having only edge routers perform
the marking allow DPM to perform traceback
with only a few packets from the attacker and
be capable of tracing thousands of attackers si-
multaneously.
In all previous discussions of DPM, the Internet
was considered to be a homogeneous network
with a single administration and perfect DPM
deployment on the edges of the network. In re-
ality, the Internet is not, and has never been, a
single homogeneous network according to [3]–
[5]. The Internet, from its very beginning, was
an interconnection of different networks. Over
time, the Internet became more structured, but
its heterogeneous nature still remains. In this
article, the structure of the Internet is described
and the relationships among the Autonomous
Systems (ASs) are explored. Then, the simple
guidelines for deploying DPM are introduced
and analyzed.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows.
Section 2 introduces the basic DPM approach;
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Section 3 describes the structure of the Internet
and AS interrelations; Section 4 describes the
perfect case of DPM deployment; Section 5 in-
troduces the guidelines for deploying DPM on
the Internet followed by an illustrative example
described in Section 6; the discussion and com-
parison of DPM to other schemes is presented
in Section 7; we conclude in Section 8.
2. DPM Principles
The basic DPM is a packet marking algorithm,
which was first introduced in [6]. Subsequently,
the issues of fragmentation and simultaneous
multiple attackers were addressed in [7]. This
section provides the general principle behind
DPM.
2.1. Assumptions
The assumptions in this section were largely
borrowed from [8]. The two key assumptions
driving this effort are:
• An attacker may generate any packet
• Routers are both CPU and memory limited
2.2. DPM Principle
As mentioned above, DPM is a packet mark-
ing algorithm [7]. The 16-bit packet ID field
and 1-bit Reserved Flag (RF) in the IP header
will be used to mark packets. Each packet is
marked when it enters the network. This mark
remains unchanged for as long as the packet tra-
verses the network. This automatically removes
the issue of mark spoofing which other mark-
ing schemes have to account for. The packet
is marked by the interface closest to the source
of the packet on an edge ingress router, as seen
in Figure 1. The routers with engraved ‘DPM’
have DPM enabled by configuring interfaces,
and the rubber-stamps signify the interfaces on
these routers that actually perform the marking.
The mark is a partial address information of
this interface. The interface makes a distinction
between incoming and outgoing packets. In-
coming packets are marked; outgoing packets
are not marked. This ensures that the egress
interface will not overwrite the mark in a packet























Figure 1. Deterministic Packet Marking.
In certain instances, a physical interface may
be an ingress interface to a customer and at the
same time it may carry traffic other than to or
from this customer. In such cases, logical or
virtual interfaces, such as VLANs, may be used
to provide necessary granularity to DPM con-
figuration on the DPM-enabled router.
For illustrative purposes, assume that the Inter-
net is a network with a single administration.
In this case, only interfaces closest to the cus-
tomers on the edge routers will participate in
packet marking. Every incoming packet will be
marked. Should an attacker attempt to spoof the
mark in order to deceive the victim, this spoofed
mark will be overwritten with a correct mark by
the very first router the packet traverses.
3. Structure of the Internet
The Internet is a hierarchical structure [3], [4].
Several ISPs, so called tier 1 ISPs, constitute the
backbone of the Internet. Very few ISPs, such as
UUNET, SprintLink, AboveNet, GBLX, AT&T
and a few others, have the status of tier 1. The
recent visualization of the Internet, where the
hierarchy can be observed, is available on the
web site of CAIDA [9]. These ISPs have a large
geographical presence to facilitate access to a
greater number of customers. Having the large
presence facilitates a convenient connection of
other ISPs. The ISPs of the second tier do not
have the geographical presence comparable to
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tier 1 ISPs. Therefore, in order to establish
connectivity to the other parts of the world, tier
2 ISPs have to buy transit services from one or
more tier 1 ISPs. The next tier of ISPs have even
less geographical presence. Yet, these ISPs are
not at the lowest levels of hierarchy. These ISPs
have to buy transit services from the upper tier
ISPs in order to establish global connectivity.
These ISPs of medium tiers are often called re-
gional ISPs. Finally, there are lowest tier ISPs,
which sell transit services only to the retail cus-
tomers such as home users and businesses. It
is also suggested in [10] that the ISP’s IP net-
works themselves have a hierarchical structure
with well defined core links and edge links.
An administrative domain, such as an ISP or an
enterprise network, may consist of more than
one AS according to [11]. For example, when
two organizations, each with its ownAS, merge,
the resulting network will be a single adminis-
trative domain encompassing two ASs. The
connectivity among the ASs is provided by the
BorderGateway Protocol (BGP), version 4 [12].
BPG is used for the exchange of routes and for
the selection of routes based on the predefined
policies. When using BGP, an AS advertises
certain routes to its neighbors. The commercial
relationships between the ASs define the rules,
also called policies, of route advertising. In the
rest of this section, relationships between ASs
classified in [11], [13], which do not always fit
the purely hierarchical structure will be exam-
ined. Figure 2 illustrates all of the relationships
















Figure 2. Illustrations of inter AS relationships.
3.1. Customer-to-provider Relationship
In the customer-provider relationship, the pro-
vider, usually an AS of a higher tier ISP, ad-
vertises all known routes to the customer, an
AS of the lower tier ISP. The customer pays for
this transit service and advertises its own routes
and the routes of its customers to the provider.
The provider in one relationship may be a cus-
tomer in another relationship, and the customer
in one relationship may be a provider in another
relationship.
For increased availability, a given customermay
enter a customer-provider relationshipwithmore
than one provider. Such an arrangement is
called multi-homing. The end customer, such
as a local ISP or an enterprise, that main-
tains customer-provider relationship with a sin-
gle provider is called a stub. In a multi-homed
arrangement, the customer does not advertise
the providers’ routes. Otherwise, the customer’s
network may be used as a transit between its
providers.
It should also be noted that the customers do
not necessarily have to connect only to the lo-
cal, lowest tier, ISPs only. ISPs of high tiers
offer retail services as well, and the end cus-
tomers may purchase transit services from them
directly.
In Figure 2, the ASs C, D, E, and I have the
customer-to-provider relationship with AS A,
and ASs E, H, and F have the customer-to-
provider relationship with AS B. Autonomous
system E has the customer-to-provider relation-
ship with both ASs A and B, and, therefore, AS
E is multi-homed.
3.2. Peer-to-peer Relationship
Two ISPs may find it mutually beneficial to ex-
change their routes to their customers directly.
This is called a peering arrangement and is usu-
ally free of charge to both parties since it usually
provides equal benefits to both ISPs. In order to
establish the peering arrangement, the respec-
tive ASs have to enter a peer-to-peer relation-
ship. In the peer-to-peer relationship, the routes
to the ASs’ own customers are usually adver-
tised to the peer AS. The peering arrangements
are not associative, meaning that two peers of
a given AS are not peers of each other, unless
they setup an explicit peer-to-peer relationship
between each other.
Peer-to-peer relationships are established usu-
ally for economic reasons. Instead of sending
traffic through the transit network, it is more
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efficient and cost effective to send the traffic di-
rectly to the peer. This reduces the amount of
traffic which is sent to the provider, as well as
offers better service between the customers of
the two peers.
There are several instances of peer-to-peer re-
lationship in Figure 2. Autonomous systems A
and B have a peer-to-peer relationship. There-
fore, the customers of A would be able to com-
municate with the customers of B without using
the providers of A and B (not shown in Fig-
ure 2). Autonomous system C has a peer-to-
peer relationship established with D and with
I. It means that the traffic from customers of C
will be able to reach the customers of D and I
without traversing A. However, the traffic from
customers of AS I will have to traverse AS A
in order to reach customers of AS D, and vice-
versa. There is also a peer-to-peer relationship
between ASs G and H.
3.3. Sibling-to-sibling Relationship
In the sibling-to-sibling relationship, the two
ASs exchange the routes to their customers,
peers and providers. In other words, the two
sibling ASs share all routes. This arrangement
is usually used for the ASs which belong to
a single administrative domain. Also, when
two stubs cannot afford a transit service by
themselves, they may effectively combine their
networks by entering the sibling-to-sibling re-
lationship and use a single connection to the
provider, provided the bandwidth requirements
are met, in order to save money.
Autonomous systems F and G in Figure 2 have
a sibling-to-sibling relationship. Since they ex-
change all of their available routes, customers
of G will have access to the rest of the Internet.
Similarly, although F does not have an explicit
peer-to-peer relationship with H, the peer-to-
peer relationship between them will exist im-
plicitly since G would share routes to the F’s
customers with H, and H’s routes with F.
3.4. Backup Relationship
Two ASs may have a backup relationship, given
that they have different providers. If the provider
of one of the ASs in the backup relationship
fails, then this AS will use its backup AS as a
transit network to the Internet. The purpose of
this arrangement is similar to that of the multi-
homing described in Section 3.1. However, in-
stead of actually purchasing transit service from
two providers, the customer purchases the tran-
sit service from one provider and enters amutual
backup relationship with another AS, which is
cheaper.
Autonomous systems H and I in Figure 2 have
a backup relationship. This means that if for
some reasons, AS B would become unavailable
to H, it would be able to maintain the connectiv-
ity to the rest of the Internet through ASs I and
A. Similarly, if AS I would loose its connectiv-
ity to A, it would still maintain the connectivity
to the rest of the Internet through ASs H and B.
The customers do not necessarily have to con-
nect only to the local ISPs only. In reality, as
seen in Figure 3, the customers may connect di-
rectly to the ISPs of the high tiers, where B has
two retail customers.
4. Ideal DPM Deployment
The ideal DPM deployment is a situation, where
every interface connecting to the customers of
all ISPs in the Internet would be DPM-enabled.










Figure 3. Ideal DPM deployment.
The collection of DPM-enabled interfaces is
called a DPM perimeter. The perimeter must
not have any holes, the access points through
which the traffic from a customer may traverse
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the Internet unmarked. The DPM perimeter is
shown in Figure 3 as a thick dotted line with
circular dots.
5. Guidelines for DPM Deployment
It cannot be expected that all ISPs will deploy
DPM simultaneously, if at all. Also, even if
that is to happen, DPM has to be disabled on
some interfaces, as it is being enabled on the
others to maintain the DPM perimeter. There-
fore, some coordinated effort on behalf of the
ISPs is needed.
NeighboringASs are defined as twoASs, which
have at least one external BGP (eBGP) session
setup between them. It is possible to have more
than one eBGP session between a pair of ASs.
Also, it is necessary to make a natural assump-
tion that an ISP is not acting maliciously. In
other words, if the ISP claims to have deployed
DPM, then it can be trusted that DPM is in fact
deployed and it is deployed according to the
guidelines described below.
Tier 1 ISPs must have DPM enabled on all edge
interfaces of all their ASs, except those which
face other ASs of tier 1 ISPs. This can be ac-
complished by the good will of these ISPs or by
forcing them to do so. Currently, all of the tier
1 ISPs are in developed countries, thus making
application of some international treaties possi-
ble.
After the Internet’s core has beenDPM-enabled,
the rest of the ISPs can join the DPM scheme
gradually. Only the ASs, whose providers have
deployed DPM, may enable DPM on its edges.
Once the AS of the lower tier enables DPM on
its edges, this fact has to be communicated to
the provider. The provider must then disable
DPM on the interface to this customer.
If there are two neighboring ASs, which are in
either sibling-to-sibling, peer-to-peer, or backup
relationship and both of them have DPM en-
abled, then both should disable DPM on the
interfaces facing each other. This requires that
ISPs share the information about DPM deploy-
ment, but it is assumed that administrations of
ASs, which have established any relationship,
would have the means and incentives to com-
municate this information to each other.
There are rare instances when a tier-1 ISP has
to use a lower tier ISP to tunnel the traffic of its
customers to another tier-1 ISP. Such cases are
rare, and should they occur, the lower tier ISP
should preferably be included in the perimeter,
or alternatively, the first tier-1 ISP should be
excluded from the perimeter. In either case, the
DPM perimeter will remain continuous.
6. Illustrative Example
Consider the network introduced in Figure 2
discussed so far. For illustrative purposes, it is
assumed that ASs A and B are tier 1 ISPs and
the rest of the ASs are tier 2. As discussed ear-
lier, A and B have to deploy DPM before the
rest of the ASs; then the following sequence of
AS deployment is considered: F, H, C, E, D, I,
and G.
Autonomous systems belonging to the tier 1
ISPs must deploy DPM first on their edge in-
terfaces. Since AS A and AS B have a peer-to-
peer relationship and both of them have DPM
enabled, the DPM must be disabled on the inter-










Figure 4. DPM deployment example,
DPM enabled on tier 1 ISPs A and B.
Next, DPM is deployed on the edge interfaces
of the first tier 2 ISP F as seen in Figure 5. Au-
tonomous system F has a single interface to B
and since both of them will have DPM enabled,
B has to disable DPM on its interface to F. If B
does not disable DPM on the interface to F, then
the attack traffic from the F’s customers will be
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marked by the edge interface of F, and then
those marks will be overwritten by the marks of
B. So, effectively, the traceback will be possi-
ble only to the edge of B. Autonomous system
F has a sibling-to-sibling relationship with AS
G. Since G, at this moment, had not deployed











Figure 5. DPM deployment example,
DPM enabled on AS F.
Deployment of ASs H, C, and E happens in
exactly the same way as deployment of AS F
by enabling DPM on their edges and disabling
DPM on the interfaces between them and tier 1
ISPs. Figure 6 depicts the network after DPM










Figure 6. DPM deployment example,
DPM enabled on AS E.
When AS D enables DPM on its edges, not
only AS A, but also its peer, AS C, has to dis-
able DPM on the interfaces to D because at that
point both C and D will have DPM deployed as










Figure 7. DPM deployment example,
DPM enabled on AS D.
Similarly, when AS I enables DPM on its edge
interfaces, the interfaces to C and H would not
need to have DPM enabled on them since the
respective ASs have DPM enabled. Also, the
DPM would have to be disabled on C’s and H’s
interfaces to I. Finally, when DPM is enabled
on the edges of AS G, it has to be disabled on
the interfaces of its peer H and of its sibling F,
which provides connectivity to G.
If it is assumed for illustrative purposes that the
network described so far is a complete Internet,
then ideal DPM deployment, shown in Figure
3 in Section 4, will result after AS G deploys
DPM on its edges.
7. Discussion of DPM
Traditionally, all IP traceback schemes perform
what is known as the full path traceback, where
a complete path of the attack packets through
the Internet is determined. Deterministic Packet
Marking does not perform full path traceback.
Only the closest to the source interface which
belongs to the DPM perimeter is determined
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during the traceback. In this section, the advan-
tages of the DPM traceback versus the full path
traceback will be addressed.
It can also be argued that the ingress address fil-
tering, described in [14], is as effective as DPM
if deployed around the same perimeter. This
argument is addressed in this section as well.
Finally, some concluding remarks on DPM and
traceback in general are made.
7.1. Comparison of DPM to Full Path
Traceback Schemes
Deterministic Packet Marking can be viewed
as a special case of Probabilistic Packet Mark-
ing (PPM) described in [8]. The differences
are that marking happens only at the edges of
the collection of the deployed networks and the
probability of marking is 100%. So what is lost
and what is gained by these changes?
Deterministic PacketMarkingmust be deployed
according to the guidelines outlined in Section
5. This requires the synchronization of efforts
on behalf of the ISPs. Probabilistic Packet
Marking, on the other hand, can be deployed
independently on every ISP. Consider the situa-
tion depicted in Figure 8, where ISP O of tier U
does not deploy a traceback scheme, and ISPs
P and R of tier U + 1 do deploy the traceback
scheme. Also, the attack path from the attacker





Figure 8. Example of partial traceback deployment.
If a full-path traceback scheme is deployed, the
partial path encompassing the routers in P and
R will be reconstructed. If DPM is deployed,
the address of the R’s interface to O will be re-
constructed. The marks of the ingress interface
of P inserted in the packets will be overwritten
by the marks of the R’s interface to O. That
is exactly why this situation is not possible in
DPM, if the deployment guidelines described in
Section 5 are followed.
Deterministic Packet Marking cannot trace the
attacks which were initiated from inside of the
DPM perimeter, situation depicted in Figure 9.
There is an unsubstantiated opinion that the at-
tackers subvert one or more routers as a part of
most attacks. In reality, subverting a router is a
difficult task, usually possible only as a result of
an improper router configuration. To get a feel
for how vulnerable is the network equipment
compared to the workstations, the Computer
Emergency Response Team (CERT) vulnera-
bility notes database [15] was examined. A vul-
nerability is a flaw in the system that can be used
to take full or partial control over the system, or
just bring it down. Vulnerability notes database
is a collection of known vulnerabilities, which
have been reported so far. For example, as of
May 12th, 2003, there were 825 known vul-
nerabilities in the database. Only 31 (less than
4%) of them were attributed to the ISP grade
network equipment, the rest to various software
packages of different platforms, and some to
home office or Local Area Network (LAN) net-
work equipment. Of these 31, only a handful
were severe enough to allow an attacker to take
control over the device. The low percentage
of ISP grade network equipment vulnerabilities
may serve as an indication on how difficult it is
to accomplish the situation depicted in Figure 9.
It can also be concluded that in the vast majority
of the attacks, the attack packets are generated







Figure 9. Situation of the subverted router inside an ISP.
There are many advantages of DPM over the
full-path marking schemes. Security issues of
PPM-like schemes arise from the fact that an at-
tacker can inject a packet, which is marked with
erroneous information. Such behavior is called
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mark spoofing. Prevention of such behavior is
accomplished by special coding techniques, and
is not 100% proof. Deterministic packet mark-
ing ensures that every packet which arrives to
the victim is correctly marked, and thus the need
in those complex and processor intensive encod-
ing techniques is unnecessary.
The following observation about all full-path
traceback schemes is made: in a datagram
packet network, the full-path traceback is as
good as the address of an ingress point in terms
of identifying the attacker. By definition, each
packet in a datagram network is individually
routed. Since every packet may take a differ-
ent path from the source to the destination, only
the ingress interface on the router closest to the
source must be the same. Packets may take dif-
ferent routes even if their source and destination
are identical. This may happen for two reasons:
due to unwanted oscillation of the network rout-
ing, or due to desired bandwidth management
techniques such as load balancing. The changes
in the route between the source of the attack
packets and the victim will be detrimental for
the full-path traceback since more than one path
for the single source would be reconstructed.
This, however, does not affect DPM.
Internet service providers may only use pub-
lic addresses for interfaces to customers and
other networks, and use private addressing plans
within their own networks. In this case, the use-
fulness of the full-path traceback becomes very
low since the information produced for the most
part cannot tell the victim much more than a few
IP addresses on the borders between ISPs. Even
if this is not the case, and public addressing
is used within ISPs’ networks, ISPs generally
feel reluctant to disclose their topologies. Full-
path traceback schemes reveal topology of all
networks by design. To limit this undesirable
behavior, only routers, whose addresses are al-
ready known, should implement such schemes.
7.2. Comparison of DPM to Ingress
Address Filtering
Source address filtering is a mechanism of en-
suring that only the packets with the valid SAs
are entering the Internet. The range of valid
addresses is set up manually on the ingress in-
terface and usually corresponds to the range of
IP addresses of the hosts, which are expected to
connect to the Internet through this interface.
Ingress address filtering is usually associated
with high processing overhead. It is usually a
subset of a large filtering mechanism, which en-
ables filtering of packets by many other fields of
layer 3 and 4 headers in the packets. To perform
this filtering, every packet has to be taken off
the fast switching hardware-based path and be
analyzed by software, thus drastically increas-
ing the processing overhead incurred by the
router for every packet. The processing over-
head, however, is not what precludes ingress ad-
dress filtering from becoming an effective pro-
tection against the DDoS attacks. Hardware-
based mechanism, which would filter packets
based on their SA only, would not be difficult to
implement. In fact, the processing overhead in-
curred for every packet on the routers would be
comparable to DPM, and none of the victim’s
processing would be necessary.
Unfortunately, ingress filtering is effective in
preventing DDoS attacks only if it is performed
on close to 100% of interfaces in the Internet
according to [16]. In addition, the ingress fil-
tering has to be constantly managed if it is not
deployed on the edges of the network, and its
effectiveness is severely degraded. Consider
Figure 10 where ISP O of tier U does imple-
ment ingress address filtering, and ISPs P and
R of tier U + 1 do not. The customer network
connects to ISP P. Assume also that at some
point in time ISP O is aware of the address
ranges used by both lower tier ISPs and the
customer. If the customer changes its provider
from P toR, then the ranges on the interface per-
forming the ingress filtering on the edges of O
have to be reconfigured to allow the traffic from
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Figure 10. Limitations of ingress address filtering.
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changes its IP address range, similar reconfigu-
ration tasks would have to be performed. If the
customer is multihomed, then O would have to
accept traffic from customers with SAs of the
interfaces from R and P. In other words, any
workstation could spoof the source address of
their packets to the ones of this customer, and
this traffic would be allowed to pass.
Once the attacker finds away for his or her pack-
ets with the spoofed SAs to pass through the
ingress filtering, the attack cannot be stopped.
DPM, however, even if deployed on the same
network as the ingress address filtering, would
provide the victim with the concrete IP ad-
dress, where the attack traffic entered the DPM
perimeter.
8. Conclusions
In this article, the structure of the Internet and
AS interrelations were discussed. The sim-
ple guidelines for DPM deployment were in-
troduced. Following those guidelines would
ensure that DPM produces the best results pos-
sible for the given collection of ISPs deploying
DPM. It was concluded that by following those
deployment guidelines, DPM can perform the
traceback as well as any other full-path trace-
back schemes.
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